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Abstract
This paper implements a unified model of individual abstention and vote choice to an-
alyze policy-based alienation and indifference in Brazil’s 2002 presidential election. The
results indicate that both alienation and indifference depressed turnout, with indifference
contributing slightly more to voter abstention. Also, the determinants of alienation and
indifference differed considerably, the former being determined by structural factors such
as voters’ information and perceived efficacy levels, while the latter was related to short-
term aspects such as parties’ mobilization efforts. More importantly, evidence shows
that while alienation and indifference were strongly influenced by attitudinal and protest
variables, they were also affected by citizens’ evaluation of candidates’ ideological loca-
tions. The main conclusion is that abstention in Brazil’s 2002 election had a policy-driven
component and that spatial considerations played a substantive role in citizens’ electoral
behavior, a fact that has been overlooked in previous research on the determinants of
abstention in Latin America.
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1. Introduction 
The effect of candidates' ideological locations on the probability of voting is one 
of the most appealing and important implications of the spatial voting literature 
pioneered by Downs (1957). Voters perceive a benefit when their policy preferences 
are similar to those of the competing candidates and will therefore vote for those 
candidates who offer policy platforms closer to their own. However, voters might 
choose not to vote if the perceived benefits from voting for either candidate is very 
small, or when different candidates offer approximately the same benefit. 
Consequently, different spatial voting models (Hinich and Ordershook, 1969; 
Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordershook, 1972; Enelow and Hinich, 1984) have 
distinguished between indifference-based abstention that occurs when candidates' 
platforms are too similar to justify the cost of voting, and alienation-based abstention 
that results when candidates' platforms are too distant from a voter to justify voting 
costs.  
    At the empirical level, however, few studies have analyzed the effect of policy-
based indifference and alienation. Evidence provided by Zipp (1985), Plane and 
Gershtenson (2004) and Adams, Dow and Merrill (2006) for the U.S., and Thurner 
and Eymann (1997) for Germany, indicates that abstention has a substantive policy-
based component.1 Nonetheless, as this review reveals, all empirical studies have 
been conducted so far in developed democracies with stable and consolidated party 
                                                 
1 Other studies (e.g., Brody and Page, 1973; Lacey and Burden, 1999) have examined the 
effect of indifference and/or alienation on voter turnout, but none of them uses spatial 
measures of these variables. 
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systems, and most of them have focused on two-candidate elections. Furthermore, 
empirical tests of hypotheses involving the impact of alienation and indifference on 
citizens' probabilities of voting have only been conducted for countries with 
voluntary voting. This paper presents the first analysis of policy-based indifference 
and alienation abstention in Latin America, using data on Brazil’s 2002 presidential 
election. Brazil has the largest electorate in Latin America, representing 36% of the 
total electorate in the continent and the largest electorate in the world subject to 
compulsory voting (International IDEA, 2006). In contrast to the homogeneous 
European party systems and the U.S. party machines, the party structure and political 
system in Brazil is highly fragmented and characterized by a low degree of party 
identification, weak institutionalization and persistent electoral volatility (Moisés, 
1993; Mainwaring, 1998; Baker, Ames, and Rennó, 2006). These structural aspects 
were also present in the 2002 presidential election, marked by high preference 
volatility among voters and frequent changes in candidates’ relative support during 
the campaign season (Baker et al., 2006).  
Hence, this paper offers two important contributions. First, it analyzes the effect 
of policy-based evaluations of candidates on citizens' probabilities of voting in an 
emerging democracy whose party system and type of electoral competition differ 
markedly from those considered in earlier research. This allows for the determination 
of whether the empirical regularities found in advanced democracies hold for other 
polities. Second, it examines the impact of policy-based indifference and alienation 
in an electorate subject to compulsory voting, an institutional arrangement not 
previously examined. While compulsory voting laws require citizens to show up at 
the polls, they do not force them to vote for any of the competing candidates: citizens 
can cast invalid votes, i.e., blank or null ballots, and thus their right not to vote 
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remains intact (Lijphart, 1997). Also, illegal abstention constitutes a second form of 
non-voting. Different theories emphasizing the role of socioeconomic, institutional, 
and protest variables have been proposed to account for invalid voting and electoral 
absenteeism in Latin America and in compulsory voting systems in general (Power 
and Roberts, 1995; Lijphart, 1997). However, no work has analyzed the impact of 
voters' evaluations of competing candidates on these variables. Examining the role of 
alienation and indifference will help to better understand the relative importance of 
policy-based abstention in compulsory voting systems and add to the long-standing 
debate surrounding compulsory voting provisions (Lijhpart, 1997; Franklin, 1999). 
In addition, in this paper I develop a new model to analyze alienation and 
indifference in multi-party electoral races. Among empirical studies on this topic, 
only Thurner and Eymann (1997) have considered multi-candidate races.2 However, 
in their model, only the positions of the two closest candidates affect voters’ 
indifference and alienation thresholds, and they ignore the effect of non-spatial 
issues on citizens’ electoral choices. The model implemented here assumes that both 
candidates’ locations and non-spatial issues affect alienation and indifference, and 
citizens consider their utility for each of the competing candidates when deciding 
whether or not to vote. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model 
implemented to analyze policy-based alienation and indifference in Brazil’s 2002 
                                                 
2 While Sanders (1998) analyzes the case of three candidates, he only considers indifference-
based abstention, and his definition of indifference and the decision-rule followed by citizens 
differ from the ones adopted in this paper. 
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presidential election. Section 3 describes the data and methodology used to estimated 
the model's parameters. Section 4 presents the most salient results. The main 
hypothesis of the paper is that abstention in the 2002 election had a policy-driven 
component and that spatial considerations played a substantive role on citizens’ 
decisions of whether or not to vote. In order to assess the validity of this claim, the 
parameter estimates are used to address three central questions: a) What were the 
main determinants of alienation and indifference; b) How did the incidence of 
alienation and indifference depend on citizens’ perceived distance from the 
candidates; c) What was the relative influence of citizens’ policy-based assessments 
on their electoral choice, compared to socioeconomic, attitudinal and protest 
variables. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Modeling alienation- and indifference-based abstention 
In order to analyze policy-based alienation and indifference in Brazil, I use a 
"unified model" (Merrill and Grofman, 1999) of abstention and candidate choice in 
which the decision whether to vote and the decision which candidate to vote for are 
both included simultaneously. The model specification is grounded in the spatial 
voting and random utility maximization literature and draws on Adams and Merrill 
(2003) and Adams et al. (2006), although it is modified and adapted to account for 
multi-candidate competition characterizing elections in Brazil. 
Voters are assumed to have preferences defined over voting for each of the 
competing candidates and over abstaining. Following spatial theorists, the model 
assumes that the probability of voting is a function of the perceived distance between 
citizens' and candidates' ideological locations. Because the information requirements 
needed to evaluate the candidates on every possible policy dimension are 
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considerably high, most citizens rely on summary ideological assessments that 
provide them with "shortcuts" into the opinions and programs of candidates and 
allow them to cast votes that reflect their ideal issue positions (Downs, 1957; 
Ordershook, 1970; Hinich and Munger, 1994). Hence, a citizen is more likely to vote 
for a candidate, the closer the candidate's ideological location is to her own's. In 
addition, non-spatial elements such as valence issues or partisanship also affect 
citizens' voting behavior (Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Shepsle, 1991). Therefore, 
citizen i ′s utility for candidate j , denoted by ( )iU j  , is  
( ) ( )2          1, 2,....
          =                               1, 2...
i i i
j i j j
i i
j j
U j b x c j J
V j J
β ε
ε
= − − + =
+ =
            (1) 
where ix  is voter i ’s ideological self-placement, jc  is candidate j ′s ideological 
placement, β  is a parameter indicating the saliency of the ideological dimension,  
i
jb   is a party identification variable,  ( )2i ij j i jV b x cβ= − −  is the systematic 
component of  i's utility for candidate j  and ε ji  is a random disturbance term. 
Abstention in this model may stem from two different sources: a citizen may 
abstain if she perceives little benefit from either candidate (alienation) or if her utility 
for the different candidates is approximately the same (indifference). An individual 
is indifferent if she does not perceive one candidate's position to be significantly 
closer to her own ideological stance than other candidates' locations (Plane and 
Gershtenson, 2004), i.e., if she does not perceive substantial differences in utility for 
the different candidates. Hence, the model assumes that individual i  is indifferent if 
there is no candidate j   such that the utility differential between j   and all the other 
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competing candidates is greater than a non-negative indifference threshold ( )iT j . 
That is, i  is indifferent if there is no candidate j   such that: 
( ) ( ) ( )   i i iU j U k T I k j− > ∀ ≠           (2) 
where the indifference threshold is given by 
( ) exp( )
          = 
i
I i
i
I
T I I
V
β=
                          (3) 
with  iI   a vector of voter attributes expected to influence her turnout decision and  
Iβ  a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
Also, an individual may abstain if she feels that no candidate will represent her 
policy preferences; that is, when "even a favorite candidate leaves the voter cold" 
(Enelow and Hinich, 1984, p. 464). Hence, citizen i is alienated if none of the 
candidates provides her with a minimum level of utility; i.e., if her utility for all of 
the competing candidates is less than or equal to an alienation threshold  ( )iT A : 
( ) ( )       1, 2,..i iU j T A j J≤ =             (4) 
 
The alienation threshold is given by 
( )
          
i i
A i A
i i
A A
T A A
V
β ε
ε
= +
= +                              (5) 
where again iA  is a vector of variables expected to influence voter turnout,  Aβ  are 
parameters to be estimated,  iA A iV Aβ+  is the systematic component of utility and iAε  
is a random term.3  
                                                 
3 In order to obtain closed form solutions for the choice probabilities of each agent, the 
number of random error terms in the model cannot exceed 1J + . Following Sanders (1998), 
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From (1) - (5), then, citizen i  votes for candidate  j   if 
                  i i i i ij j k k IV V V k jε ε+ − + > ∀ ≠    and  i i i ij j A AV Vε ε+ > +        (6) 
and abstains if she is indifferent or alienated.  
Assuming that the utility errors are distributed type-I extreme value yields closed 
form solutions for the choice probabilities of citizen i :4  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
exp
Vote for candidate 
exp exp exp exp
i
ji
i i i i
j I k A
k j
V
P j
V V V V
≠
= ⎡ ⎤+ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑
              (7) 
( ) ( )
1
Abstain 1- Vote for candidate 
J
i i
j
P P j
=
= ∑                                                        (8) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )1
exp
Indifferent 1
exp exp exp
iJ
ji
j i i i
j I k
k j
V
P
V V V=
≠
= − ⎡ ⎤+ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑
∑
                                    (9) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
exp
Alienated
exp exp
i
Ai
J
i i
j A
j
V
P
V V
=
=
+∑
                                                               (10) 
 
Note that, although the error terms for the different candidates and for the 
alienation threshold are assumed to be independent, the choice probabilities do not 
                                                                                                                                          
Adams and Merril (2003) and Merril et al. (2006), I omit the error term in the specification 
of the indifference threshold. 
4 The derivation of equations (7)-(10) is given in the Appendix.  
 
 9
have the independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, since the denominators 
of each choice probability differ.5  
 
Estimation is performed through maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood 
function can be written as: 
 ( ) ( )
1 1
log Vote for candidate log Abstain
n J
i i i i
j A
i j
Log likelihood Y P j Y P
= =
⎡ ⎤− = +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑   
where ( )Vote for candidate iP j  and ( )AbstainiP  are given by equations (7) and (8) 
and  ijY ,  
i
AY  equal one for an individual who votes for candidate j  and abstains, 
respectively.  
 
 3. Data and methodology 
The 2002 presidential election provides an interesting case to examine the relative 
impact of policy-based indifference and alienation in Brazil. On the one hand, unlike 
in previous elections, candidates’ policy platforms seemed to play a key role on 
voters’ electoral choice, probably at least in part due to an unprecedented media 
coverage that generated high levels of political interest among the electorate 
(Canelas, 2002; Carreirão, 2004). On the other hand, popular dissatisfaction with the 
government and scandals involving some of the candidates reinforced the tendencies 
towards protest voting and vote switching among the electorate (Carreirão, 2004, 
Baker et al., 2006).    
                                                 
5 IIA holds, however, if ( ) ( )exp exp    , ,  i ij kV V j k j k= ∀ ≠  (Sanders, 1998). 
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The data used in the analysis is drawn from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES) post-election survey. To the author’s knowledge, this is the only 
publicly available dataset that asks Brazilian respondents to place candidates 
competing in the 2002 election on an ideological scale. Moreover, the CSES was 
designed specifically for cross-national application and covers other Latin-American 
and emerging democracies. Thus the results obtained here can be contrasted with 
those in other countries.  
The dependent variable is based on respondents' self-report of voting, and 
indicates whether each individual abstained or voted for one of the three main 
candidates competing in the first-round of the Presidential election: Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva, of the Workers' Party (PT), Jose Serra, of the Brazilian Social Democratic 
Party (PSDB), and Anthony Garotinho, of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). 6 
Candidates whose ideological position was not asked in the survey were not 
considered in the analysis and respondents who voted for these candidates were 
deleted from the sample.7 Since illegal abstention and invalid voting can be thought 
of as "functional equivalents" of abstention in democracies with voluntary voting 
(Lavareda, 1991; Power and Roberts, 1995), all respondents admitting they did not 
vote and those reporting that they cast a blank or null ballot are treated as abstainers. 
                                                 
6 A second-round run-off between Lula and Serra was conducted 3 weeks after the first 
round, and Lula became President of the country. 
7 119 observations were deleted for this reason, corresponding to respondents who voted for 
Ciro Gomez, the candidate who finished fourth in the electoral contest. 
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The squared distance between respondents' and candidates' ideological locations 
in equation (1) is computed using the survey item asking respondents to place 
themselves and each of the major candidates on a 10-point left-right scale. 
Candidates' ideological locations are approximated using the mean of respondents' 
placements of the candidates (Rabinowitz, Macdonald, and Listhaug, 1991; Alvarez, 
1998). Party identification is a dummy variable scored 1 if the voter identifies with 
the candidate's party and 0 otherwise.  Table 1 below presents the sample vote share 
of the different electoral alternatives, including abstention, as well as the candidates' 
ideological locations and percentage of partisan voters. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The alienation and indifference thresholds in equations (3) and (5) are modeled as 
functions of socioeconomic, attitudinal, political and protest variables that have been 
found to affect voter turnout. The socioeconomic variables included in the model are: 
Age; Gender, a dichotomous variable coded 1 for male and 0 for female; and 
Education, coded on an eight point-scale ranging from no education to completed 
university degree. The attitudinal variables are Political information, calculated as 
the number of correct answers provided by the respondent to the three political 
information items included in the CSES survey; and Political efficacy, captured by 
the respondent's agreement with the statement "Who people vote for makes a 
difference". I also include Party contact, a dummy variable scored at 1 if the 
respondent was contacted by any of the candidates or parties during the electoral 
campaign and at 0 otherwise. Based on available empirical evidence (Verba, Nie, 
and Kim, 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Zipp, 1985; Plane and 
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Gershtenson, 2004), I expect these variables to negatively affect the probability of 
abstaining. 
In addition, previous research (Moisés, 1993; Power and Roberts, 2005) suggests 
that popular dissatisfaction with the political system and party elites in Brazil tends 
to increase the percentage of blank and null ballots and illegal abstention. Hence, I 
include three "protest" variables aimed at capturing respondents' discontentment with 
the political establishment: Dissatisfaction with government, measuring respondents' 
disapproval of government’s performance; Dissatisfaction with democracy, 
capturing respondents' discontent with the democratic process; and Corruption, 
measuring perceived corruption levels among politicians. These variables are 
obtained from respondents' answers to three four-scale items included in the CSES 
survey. Since the relevant empirical literature does not distinguish between 
individual factors affecting indifference from those affecting alienation, I follow 
Adams et al. (2006) and include all the above mentioned variables in the alienation 
and indifference thresholds.     
The following equations define the specification of respondents' utilities for the 
different candidates, their indifference thresholds and their alienation thresholds: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )20 1 2Party identification Ideological distance      1, 2,3.i ijU j jβ β β ε= + + + =  
  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 1
8 9
Age Gender Education Information Efficacy
exp Party contact Dissatisfaction with government
Dissatisfaction with democracy Corruption
iT I
α α α α α α
α α
α α
⎡ ⎤+ + + + + +⎢ ⎥= + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 3 4 5
6 7
8 9
Age Gender Education Information Efficacy
             Party contact Dissatisfaction with government
            Dissatisfaction with democracy Corruption
i
i
A
T A γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ ε
= + + + + +
+ +
+ +
 
 
The coefficients for party identification and squared ideological distance, 1β  and 
2β , are constrained to be the same across candidates. This corresponds to the 
assumption that the effect of these factors on citizens' evaluations of the different 
candidates is the same (Adams et al., 2006).8  Also, it is necessary to normalize 0β  
for one of the candidates (Garotinho).  
Estimation was performed in STATA 9. The log-likelihood function was 
implemented in a STATA ado file and the parameters were estimated using method 
lf; the likelihood function maximized without difficulty.9 Based on the point 
estimates and the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates, the predicted 
probabilities in (8)–(10) were computed for each respondent using a simulation-
based approach (King et al., 2000), and the sample mean of these predicted 
probabilities was then used to estimate the aggregate rates of alienation, indifference 
and abstention.  
 
Before presenting the estimation results, it is worth mentioning some of the 
limitations of the analysis. The main caveat stems from the construction of the 
dependent variable: as it has been widely recognized, self-reports of voting are 
                                                 
8 Relaxing this assumption does not significantly change the parameter estimates. 
9  The code is available from the author on request. 
 
 14
affected by perceptions of socially accepted behavior, incorrect recall, and response 
biases (Silver, Abramson and Anderson, 1986; Belli, Traugott, Young, and 
McGonagle, 1999). This is reflected in the fact that the percentage of abstainers in 
the sample (Table 1) is about half of that in the electorate, probably due to effects of 
social undesirability of non-voting. Although research in the U.S. has shown that 
substantive conclusions obtained from models estimated using self-reported data do 
not differ significantly from those using validated data (Katosh and Traugott, 1981; 
Sigelman, 1982),  there is no way to confirm the validity of these findings for the 
case of Brazil.  
Second, the model implemented in this study assumes that voters' electoral choice 
is mainly driven by their evaluation of the different candidates and their perceptions 
of how close the candidates' positions are relative to their own. This is in fact the 
central hypothesis of spatial voting models. However, as noted by Zipp (1985), it 
might be the case that the causality operates in the inverse direction, i.e., that voters 
first decided whether or not to vote and which candidate to choose, and then 
rationalized their choice by placing their chosen candidate closer to their own 
ideological position. While using the sample mean placement for the candidates as 
an approximation to their ideological location tends to attenuate the bias introduced 
by this post-decision rationalization, it is unlikely that this procedure completely 
eliminates its effect. Nonetheless, this approach has been shown to yield quite 
accurate estimates of the true position of the candidates (Markus and Converse, 
1978; Page, 1978; Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida, 1989), and available empirical 
evidence (e.g., Brody and Page, 1973) suggests that this ex-post rationalization is not 
important enough to reverse the direction of the causality in the choice process. 
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4. Empirical results 
Table 2 below reports the estimated parameters of the model and their standard 
errors for the 2002 presidential election in Brazil. Several of the parameters are 
statistically significant and exhibit signs that are in the expected direction, and a LR 
test of the joint significance of the variables included in the model indicates that they 
are significant at the 0.01 level. The goodness-of-fit indices imply a moderately high 
explanatory power of the variables.  
The coefficients for party identification and ideological distance are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. In line with the spatial model of voting, respondents' 
utilities for a candidate decreased with the (squared) ideological distance and 
increased when they identified with the candidate's party.10  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The parameter estimates in Table 2 also show that the determinants of alienation 
and and indifference differ considerably. Older voters were more likely to be 
alienated in the 2002 presidential election; however, age had no statistically 
significant effect on the probability of being indifferent. Among the attitudinal 
variables, more informed respondents and those with higher perceived efficacy levels 
were less likely to be alienated; however, these variables had no systematic effect on 
the probability of being indifferent. The opposite is true for the effect of parties' 
mobilization campaigns: respondents who were contacted by parties or candidates 
                                                 
10 The strong and significant effects of ideological distance and party identification hold 
even if these coefficients are not constrained to be the same across candidates. 
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during the electoral campaign were less likely to be indifferent, but this variable had 
no systematic effect on alienation. Hence, while alienation was closely related to 
structural, long-term factors such as respondents' information levels, perceived 
efficacy and political experience, indifference was more influenced by short-term 
aspects such as candidates' mobilization efforts.  
Among "protest variables", only the respondents' perceived level of political 
corruption is statistically significant at the usual confidence levels: higher perceived 
levels of corruption increased the probability of being both indifferent and alienated. 
This result is in line with previous evidence regarding the effect of political 
corruption on citizens' political behavior in Brazil (Moisés, 1993) and indicates that 
the widespread levels of political corruption perceived by the public opinion might 
lead some voters to disqualify all electoral alternatives and discredit democratic 
politics as a whole. This might entail potentially dangerous consequences for the 
consolidation of representative institutions and a republican political culture in an 
emerging democracy such Brazil’s (Moisés, 1993; Canache and Alison, 2005). 
Table 3 reports the rates of alienation, indifference and abstention for the whole 
sample and discriminated by relevant socioeconomic, attitudinal and protest 
variables. The results indicate that both alienation and indifference depressed turnout 
in the 2002 presidential election, with indifference contributing slightly more to 
voter abstention. Also, the incidence of alienation and indifference varied 
considerably with the individual characteristics of the respondents. As expected, 
alienation and indifference were higher for respondents with lower levels of political 
efficacy and higher perceived levels of corruption, for those not contacted by the 
parties or candidates and for those who expressed no partisan preference. Two 
remarkable results that emerge from Table 3 are the high incidence of indifference 
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among more educated and informed respondents and the high rate of alienation 
among older respondents. As argued below, these findings are related to the fact that 
more educated and informed respondents in the sample exhibit moderate ideological 
positions, while the distribution of older respondents is skewed to the right of the 
ideological scale. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 
Next, I analyze the effect of the perceived ideological distance between 
respondents and candidates on alienation and indifference. Figure 1- (a) plots the 
abstention rate as a function of respondents' ideological self-placement in the left-
right scale, decomposed by type of abstention: alienation-based only, indifference-
based only, and both. Figure 1-(b) complements this information, plotting the 
incidence of alienation and indifference as a function of respondents' ideological 
self-placement. In both cases, candidates' ideological placements are also plotted.  
Some interesting patterns emerge from these figures. First, abstention increases as 
one moves to the right of the most right-wing candidate (Serra) and to left of the 
most left-wing candidate (Lula). In fact, respondents located at the right-wing 
extreme of the ideological scale exhibit the highest propensities to abstain. However, 
abstention also rises among respondents situated towards the middle of the scale, 
especially among those whose ideological self-placement locates them between Lula 
and Garotinho. Figure 1-(b) also shows that the relative incidence of alienation and 
indifference abstention varies according to respondents' self placement. While the 
propensity to abstain for respondents situated at the extremes of the ideological scale 
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was mainly driven by alienation and rose with the distance to the closest candidate, 
indifference was predominant among more "centrists" voters, and its incidence 
tended to increase the smaller the difference in the distance between the respondents 
and the competing candidates. In this sense, the fact that a majority of respondents in 
the sample hold moderate positions explains the higher incidence of indifference vis-
à-vis alienation reported in Table 3.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
          
 
These results show that respondents' tendencies to abstain in the 2002 presidential 
election were clearly related to their perceived distances from the candidates. Figure 
2 explores this issue further: Figure 2-(a) plots respondents' probabilities of being 
alienated as a function of their distance to the closest candidate, while Figure 2-(b) 
plots the probabilities of being indifferent as a function of the difference in the 
distance between respondents and the closest and most distant candidates. 
Both figures confirm the substantive conclusions regarding the effect of the 
perceived ideological distance between respondents and candidates on alienation and 
indifference: respondents' tendencies to abstain due to alienation rose with the 
distance between them and the closest candidate, while the predisposition to abstain 
due to indifference increased as the difference in the distance between respondents 
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and the closest and most distant candidates was reduced.11 Thus, although the 
coefficient estimates reported in Section 4.1 indicate that attitudinal, political and 
"protest" variables were important determinants of alienation and indifference in the 
Brazilian 2002 presidential election, the empirical evidence presented here suggests 
that these variables do not account for the whole story, and that respondents' 
evaluation of candidates’ platforms also played a significant role on their decision to 
abstain.                
 
[Figure 2 here] 
                                                           
In order to analyze the relative impact on abstention of voter’s policy-based 
assessments against alternative factors considered in the literature, I compute the 
change in the aggregate rate of abstention due to variations in respondents’ 
socioeconomic, attitudinal and protest variables and in their ideological distance 
from the candidates. For each respondent in the sample, the variable whose effect is 
analyzed is moved one unit below to one unit above its actual value, holding all other 
variables at their observed levels. Table 4 reports the resulting changes in the rate of 
abstention.12  
 
                                                 
11 Using alternative indicators to measure the impact of ideological distance on indifference 
(e.g., taking the difference in the distance between the respondent and the two closest 
candidates) does not substantially alter the results presented in Figure 2-(b). 
12 In the case of the two binary variables, gender and mobilization, the effect is measured as 
a change from 0 to 1 for each respondent in the sample. 
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[Table 4 here] 
 
The results of Table 4 indicate that changes in citizens’ perceived distance from 
the candidates had a relatively low effect on the probability of abstaining, compared 
to the impact of similar changes in socioeconomic, attitudinal and protest variables. 
Moving the ideological distance from each candidate one percent below to one 
percent above its actual value for each respondent in the sample leads to an increase 
of 0.73 percentage points in the rate of abstention. Similar changes in the perceived 
levels of efficacy and corruption change the aggregate likelihood of abstaining by 
6.12 and 8.81 percent, respectively. Hence, although the relatively low influence of 
policy-based assessments on abstention can in part be explained by the 
counterbalancing effect of ideological distance on alienation and indifference, 
evidence indicates that abstention was mainly influenced by citizens’ levels of 
political information and perceived efficacy, by their discontentment with the 
political elites and by parties’ canvassing efforts.  
However, spatial issues did play a substantial role in citizens’ electoral behavior 
on the 2002 election. Including the ideological distance variables in the unified 
model of abstention and candidate choice substantially increases the explanatory 
power of the model: a LR-test leads to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of 
ideological distance are all zero at the 0.01 level and, in fact, both the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) indicate 
that a specification containing only the ideological distance variables should be 
preferred to models containing only socioeconomic, attitudinal or protest variables 
(Table 5).  
[Table 5 here] 
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The role played by ideological considerations on citizens’ decisions of whether to 
vote and for which candidate to vote was in fact reflected in Lula’s successful 2002 
campaign. One of the most salient features of the campaign was its emphasis on 
conveying an image of political moderation and the adoption of more “centrist” 
political stances that contributed to his electoral success (Carreirão, 2004; Samuels, 
2004). Although it is not possible to formally test this hypothesis with the available 
data, a simple exercise of shifting the ideological location of Lula 1 unit to the left 
while keeping the position of the other candidates constant leads to an increase in the 
rate of abstention of 2.11 percent and a decline in Lula’s vote share of almost 2 
percentage points, suggesting that this “move to the center” resulted in non-
negligible electoral payoffs for the PT.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Although the spatial voting literature has long ago distinguished between policy-
based alienation and indifference as potential causes for abstention, empirical tests of 
alienation and indifference have been scarce and have focused exclusively on 
developed democracies. This paper presents the first empirical study of the 
determinants of indifference and alienation and their relative incidence on abstention 
in an emerging democracy, analyzing the 2002 presidential election in Brazil. 
The evidence reported in Section 4 indicates that both indifference and alienation 
contributed to increase abstention in the 2002 election, with indifference accounting 
for slightly more than 50% of the rate of abstention. The results reveal significant 
differences between the determinants of alienation and indifference: the former was 
linked to structural, long-term phenomenon factors, such as citizens' information 
levels, perceived efficacy and political experience, while the latter was strongly 
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related to short-term factors such as candidates' mobilization strategies. Among the 
“protest” variables, only the perceived level of corruption had a positive and 
statistically significant effect on alienation- and indifference-based abstention. As a 
result, the incidence of indifference and alienation varied considerably with 
respondents’ individual attributes.  
The most important finding of this paper is that although alienation and 
indifference were strongly influenced by attitudinal and "protest" variables (in 
particular, the perceived levels of corruption among political elites), they were also 
affected by citizens' evaluation of candidates' ideological locations. In the words of 
Plane and Gershtenson (2004), while some abstainers were simply uninformed, 
apathetic or expressed their discontentment with the political elite, others evaluated 
the different alternatives and took into account the relative benefits of voting for the 
competing candidates in their decision-making process. This result coincides with 
previous empirical evidence for developed democracies and indicates that even in a 
context of weakly rooted parties and high preference volatility such as the one 
prevailing in Brazil, abstention had a policy-based component. In fact, ideological 
and policy considerations played a substantial role in explaining citizens’ electoral 
behavior in the 2002 presidential election in Brazil.  
Underscoring the importance of citizens' evaluations of candidates’ platforms in 
their probability of voting constitutes the major contribution of this paper, since 
previous research on the determinants of abstention in Latin America had only 
considered the effect of socioeconomic, institutional and protest variables, leaving 
aside spatial considerations that have been proven central to the understanding of 
electoral politics in developed democracies. In view of the evidence presented in this 
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paper, such spatial considerations also play a potentially relevant role in other 
political and institutional contexts. 
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6. Tables and graphs 
 
Table 1 
Candidates’ sample vote share, ideological location and partisanship  
Alternative Voter share Ideological location 
% of partisan 
voters 
Lula (PT) 52.16 3.45 9.16 
Serra (PSDB) 20.78 6.65 3.10 
Garotinho (PSB) 12.77 5.89 0.29 
Abstention 14.29   
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Table 2 
Parameter estimates and standard error (in parenthesis) 
Independent variable Candidate Indifference Alienation 
Party identification 1.38*** (0.17)   
Ideological distance -0.02*** (0.00)   
Age  -0.25 (0.19) 0.54*** (0.22) 
Gender  0.20 (0.27) -0.09 (0.39) 
Education  -0.00 (0.07) 0.05 (0.09) 
Information  0.15 (0.23) -0.86*** (0.28) 
Efficacy  -0.09 (0.11) -0.27*** (0.13) 
Party contact  -0.73** (0.36) -0.30 (0.39) 
Dissatisfaction with government   -0.01 (0.19) 0.26 (0.17) 
Dissatisfaction with democracy  0.05 (0.15) -0.19 (0.24) 
Corruption  0.65*** (0.24) 0.41*(0.21) 
Intercept  -0.04 (0.85) 0.54***(0.22) 
Log Likelihood: - 1587.56 
LR Statistic  (χ2  with 20 d.o.f.): 170.02* 
Pseudo-R2=0.32 
% Correctly predicted by alternativea (vs. Null Modelb):     
da Silva: 53.38 (52.16) ; Serra: 63.33 (0); Garotinho: 100 (0); Abstention: 38.89 (0).                
Number of Observations: 1386 
Significance levels (two tailed): *** p<0.01,  ** p<0.05, * p<0.10   
a  The percentage of correct predictions for each alternative is computed as the number of 
correct predictions divided by the total number of predictions for that alternative. 
b The null model predicts that the dependent variable for each observation will take the value 
of the most common outcome in the sample. 
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Table 3 
Aggregate proportion of alienation, indifference and abstention  
 
 Alienated 
only 
Indifferent 
only 
Alienated 
and 
indifferent 
Abstention 
rate 
Total  7.12 (3.96, 11.05) 
8.36 
(5.17, 12.44) 
1.10 
(0.80, 1.45) 
16.58 
(14.43, 19.10) 
Age      
 18-25 3.59 (0.94, 7.02) 
11.64 
(7.53, 16.50) 
0.83 
(0.43, 1.30) 
16.05 
(13.03, 19.84) 
 > 65 17.06  (10.38, 24.59) 
5.08 
(1.26, 10.76) 
1.79 
(0.72, 3,38) 
23.94 
(19.01, 29.58) 
Education      
 None 13.64 (9.00, 18.40) 
5.50 
(2.11, 10.10) 
1.67 
(0.75, 2.96) 
20.81 
(17.30, 24.44) 
 University  6.28 (2.71, 10.88) 
7.90 
(3.95, 12.74) 
0.93 
(0.50, 1.50) 
15.11 
(11.38, 19.37) 
Information      
 Lowest 16.04 (10.15, 22.63) 
5.89 
(1.71, 11.39) 
2.10 
(1.00, 3.55) 
24.03 
(19.82, 28.75) 
 Highest 2.68 (0.64, 5.44) 
10.37 
(7.40, 13.76) 
0.56 
(0.22, 1.01) 
13.62 
(10.99, 16.53) 
Efficacy       
 Lowest 14.14 (7.14, 21.70) 
11.20 
(4.82, 19.87) 
3.06 
(1.86, 4.48) 
28.40 
(23.01, 34.26) 
 Highest 6.37 (3.26, 10.01) 
7.69 
(4.59, 11.59) 
0.82 
(0.58, 1.09) 
14.88 
(12.68, 17.35) 
Party 
contact 
     
 No 7.70 (3.77, 12.31) 
11.26 
(7.02, 16.30) 
1.61 
(1.16, 2.14) 
20.57 
(17.87, 23.57) 
 Yes 6.48 (3.51, 9.80) 
5.64 
(2.75, 9.36) 
0.60 
(0.37, 0.90) 
12.72 
(10.48, 15.35) 
Perceived 
corruption 
     
 Lowest 7.38 (3.44, 12.25) 
1.71 
(0.38, 3.55) 
0.16 
(0.04, 0.33) 
9.26 
(5.64, 13.64) 
 Highest 8.26 (4.14, 13.17) 
11.22 
(6.86, 16.48) 
1.65 
(1.22, 2.15) 
21.14 
(18.41, 24.43) 
Partisanship      
 Independents 7.61 (4.09, 12.04) 
8.62 
(5.13, 12.59) 
1.15 
(0.85, 1.50) 
17.38 
(15.12, 20.05) 
 Partisans 6.03 (3.34, 9.34)  
7.32 
(4.45, 10.67) 
0.84 
(0.59,1.11) 
14.19 
(12.20, 16.58) 
Note: The 90 percent confidence intervals are reported in parenthesis.  
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              Figure 1 
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                                                         Figure 2  
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Table 4 
Effect of changes in different variables on the rate of abstention  
Independent variable 
Change in abstention rate  
(in percentage points) 
Age 2.52 
Gender 1.21 
Education 0.58 
Information -6.12 
Efficacy -2.75 
Party contact -6.96 
Dissatisfaction with government 2.74 
Dissatisfaction with democracy 0.24 
Corruption 8.81 
Ideological distance 0.73 
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Table 5 
Comparison of alternative unified models of abstention and candidate choice 
Model AICb BICb 
Only socioeconomic variablesa -1651.75 -1656.89 
Only attitudinal variablesa -1643.71 -1648.85 
Only protest variablesa -1636.27 -1641.41 
Only ideological distance variablesa -1630.56 -1632.84 
                               a Each model contains party identification variables. 
        b AIC and BIC are defined as:  
        $( )AIC LL kθ= − , $( ) 1 log( )2BIC LL k n nθ= − × × ,   
         where  k =  number of regressors,  n =  number of observations. 
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7. Appendix: Derivation of choice probabilities  
From equation (6), citizen i  votes for candidate j   if 
                  i i i i ij j k k IV V V k jε ε+ − + > ∀ ≠    and  i i i ij j A AV Vε ε+ > + . 
Therefore,  
( ) ( )
( )
Vote for candidate >  ,
                                        ,
i i i i i I i i i i
j j k k i j j A A
i i i i I i i i i
k j j k i A j j A
P j P V V V k j V V
P V V V k j V V
ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε
= + − − ∀ ≠ + > +
= < + − − ∀ ≠ < + −    (A.1) 
 
Assuming that ,   1,....ij j Jε =  and iAε   are random with independent standard 
extreme value distribution of type I, we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
R ,
R
Vote for candidate  ...     .....
                                               
i i i i i i i
k j j k i A j j i
i i i i i i i
j k A J A
k jV V I k j V A
i i i i i i i i
j j j k I j j A
k j
P j f f f d d d
f F V V V F V V d
ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε
≠< + − − ≠ < + −
≠
=
⎛ ⎞= + − − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∏∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
∏∫ ij
 
and using the expressions for the pdf and cdf of the extreme value distribution:13 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
R
R
Vote for candidate 
exp  exp exp  exp exp   exp  
exp  exp exp 1 exp exp  
i
i i i i i i i i i i
j j j j k I j j A j
k j
i i i i i i i i
j j j k A j A j
k j
P j
V V V V V d
V V V V V d
ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε
≠
≠
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − − − + + − − +⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − − − + − + + + − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑∫
∑∫
      
 
                                                 
13 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )exp  exp exp ,  exp expf Fε ε ε ε ε⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − − = − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
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Denoting:   
( ) ( )log 1 exp expi i i ij k i j j
k j
V V I V Aλ
≠
⎛ ⎞= + − + + + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑          (A.2) 
we can write the above equation as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
R
R
Vote for candidate exp  exp exp  exp  
                                        = exp  exp exp   
i i i i
j j j
i i i
j j j
P j d
d
ε ε λ ε
ε ε λ ε
⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − − +⎣ ⎦
∫
∫        (A.3) 
Using the change of variable: 
,ij
i
j
x
dx d
ε λ
ε
= −
=  
equation (A.2) becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
R
R
Vote for candidate exp  exp exp  
                                        
                                       exp exp  exp exp  
iP j x x dx
x x dx
λ
λ
⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎣ ⎦
∫
∫
     (A.4) 
and since ( ) ( )exp  exp expx x⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦  is the pdf of a variable x  with extreme value 
(type I) distribution, we have that: 
( ) ( )Vote for candidate expiP j λ= −  
and from equation (A.2): 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1Vote for candidate 
1 exp exp  
exp
                                     
exp exp exp exp  
i
i i i i
j k i j j
k j
i
j
i i i
j i k j
k j
P j
V V I V A
V
V I V A
≠
≠
= ⎡ ⎤+ − + + + − +⎣ ⎦
= + +
∑
∑
  
which is equation (7) in the model. Equation (8) follows immediately. 
 33
Analogously, we have that   
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
  
                                              
exp
                                            
exp exp exp  
i i i i i i i i
j k j j k j I
i i i i i
j j j k I
i
j
i i i
j I k
k j
P U U T I k j P V V V k j
P V V V k j
V
V V V
ε ε
ε ε
≠
− > ∀ ≠ = + − − > ∀ ≠
= < + − − ∀ ≠
= + ∑
 
and therefore, from the definition of indifference given in equation (2):   
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1
exp
Indifferent 1
exp exp exp  
iJ
ji
i i i
j j I k
k j
V
P
V V V=
≠
= − +∑ ∑  
which is equation (9) in the model. 
Finally, from equation (4), the probability that citizen i  is alienated is: 
( ) ( )
( )
,    1, 2....
                       ,  1, 2....
i i i i i
j j A A
i i i i
j A A j
P Alienated P V V j J
P V V j J
ε ε
ε ε
= + ≤ + =
= ≤ + − =  
Therefore 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1R , 1,...
1R
Alienated  .....  ...
                          
i i i i
j A A j
J
i i i i i i
A j J A
jV V j J
J
i i i i i
A A A j A
j
P f f d d d
f F V V d
ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε
=< + − =
=
=
= + −
∏∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
∏∫
  
and a procedure similar to the one follow to derive equation (7) yields: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
exp
Alienated
exp exp
i
Ai
J
i i
j A
j
V
P
V V
=
=
+∑
  
which is equation (10) in the model. 
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